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اسم المادة: تحليل الخطاب

اسم الكلية: التربية

تاريخ الامتحان:2013/٥/25

الفرقة: الثالثة عام

الشعبة: اللغة الانجليزية

The question:

Write to discuss Two only of the following:

1. **Cooperative principle**
2. **Discourse markers**
3. **Speech act performatives**
4. **Mind control**

Answer key

1. **The Cooperative Principle**

"Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" Grice (1975:45)

The Maxims

1. Quantity Make your contribution as informative as is required

   Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

2. Quality Do not say what you believe to be false

   Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

3. Relation

   Be relevant

4. Manner

   Avoid obscurity of expression

   Avoid ambiguity

   Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)

   Be orderly

The four maxims should be explained with examples. A student should also mention that in case a speaker breaks either by violating or by floating a maxim conversational implicature is used as a make-up strategy to breach the breakage. This should also be supported by examples.

2. Discourse markers

'Discourse markers' is the term linguists give to the little words like 'well', 'oh', 'but', and 'and' that break our speech up into parts and show the relation between parts. 'Oh' prepares the hearer for a surprising or just-remembered item, and 'but' indicates that sentence to follow is in opposition to the one before. However, these markers don't necessarily mean what the dictionary says they mean. Some people use 'and' just to start a new thought, and some people put 'but' at the end of their sentences, as a way of trailing off gently. Realizing that these words can function as discourse markers is important to prevent the frustration that can be experienced if you expect every word to have its dictionary meaning every time it's used.

3. Speech act performatives

In saying something one generally intends more than just to communicate-- getting oneself understood is intended to produce some effect on the listener. However, our speech act vocabulary can obscure this fact. When one apologizes, for example, one may intend not merely to express regret but also to seek forgiveness. Seeking forgiveness is, strictly speaking, distinct from apologizing, even though one utterance is the performance of an act of both types. As an apology, the utterance succeeds if it is taken as expressing regret for the deed in question; as an act of seeking forgiveness, it succeeds if forgiveness is thereby obtained. Speech acts, being perlocutionary as well as illocutionary, generally have some ulterior purpose, but they are distinguished primarily by their illocutionary type, such as asserting, requesting, promising and apologizing, which in turn are distinguished by the type of attitude expressed. The perlocutionary act is a matter of trying to get the hearer to form some correlative attitude and in some cases to act in a certain way. For

example, a statement expresses a belief and normally has the further purpose of getting the addressee form the same belief. A request expresses a desire for the addressee to do a certain thing and normally aims for the addressee to intend to and, indeed, actually do that thing. A promise expresses the speaker's firm intention to do something, together with the belief that by his utterance he is obligated to do it, and normally aims further for the addressee to expect, and to feel entitled to expect, the speaker to do it.

Statements, requests, promises and apologies are examples of the four major categories of communicative illocutionary acts: constatives, directives, commissives and acknowledgments. This is the nomenclature used by Kent Bach and Michael Harnish, who develop a detailed taxonomy in which each type of illocutionary act is individuated by the type of attitude expressed (in some cases there are constraints on the content as well). There is no generally accepted terminology here, and Bach and Harnish borrow the terms 'constative' and 'commissive' from Austin and 'directive' from Searle. They adopt the term 'acknowledgment', over Austin's 'behabitive' and Searle's 'expressive', for apologies, greetings, congratulations etc., which express an attitude regarding the hearer that is occasioned by some event that is thereby being acknowledged, often in satisfaction of a social expectation. Here are assorted examples of each type:

Constatives: affirming, alleging, announcing, answering, attributing, claiming, classifying, concurring, confirming, conjecturing, denying, disagreeing, disclosing, disputing, identifying, informing, insisting, predicting, ranking, reporting, stating, stipulating

Directives: advising, admonishing, asking, begging, dismissing, excusing, forbidding, instructing, ordering, permitting, requesting, requiring, suggesting, urging, warning

Commissives: agreeing, guaranteeing, inviting, offering, promising, swearing, volunteering

Acknowledgments: apologizing, condoling, congratulating, greeting, thanking, accepting (acknowledging an acknowledgment)

Bach and Harnish spell out the correlation between type of illocutionary act and type of expressed attitude. In many cases, such as answering, disputing, excusing and agreeing, as well as all types of acknowledgment, the act and the attitude it expresses presuppose a specific conversational or other social circumstance.

4. Mind control

If controlling discourse is a first major form of power, controlling people's minds is the other fundamental way to reproduce dominance and hegemony.' Within a CDA
framework, "mind control" involves even more than just acquiring beliefs about the world through discourse and communication. Suggested below are ways that power
and dominance are involved in mind control. First, recipients tend to accept beliefs, knowledge, and opinions (unless they are inconsistent with their personal beliefs and experiences) through discourse from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy, or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals, or reliable media (Nesler et al. 1993).

Second, in some situations participants are obliged to be recipients of discourse, e.g. in education and in many job situations. Lessons, learning materials, job instructions, and other discourse types in such cases may need to be attended to, interpreted, and learned as intended by institutional or organizational authors (Giroux 1981).

Third, in many situations there are no pubic discourses or media that may provide information from which alternative

beliefs may be derived (Downing 1984).

Fourth, and closely related to the previous points, recipients may not have the knowledge and beliefs needed to challenge the discourses or information they are exposed to (Wodak 1987).

Whereas these conditions of mind control are largely contextual (they say something about the participants of a communicative event), other conditions are discursive,

that is, a function of the structures and strategies of text or talk itself. In other words, given a specific context, certain meanings and forms of discourse have more influence on people's minds than others, as the very notion of "persuasion" and a tradition of 2000 years of rhetoric may show.'

Once we have elementary insight into some of the structures of the mind, and what it means to control it, the crucial question is how discourse and its structures are able to exercise such control.

As suggested above, such discursive influence may be due to context as well as to the structures of text and talk themselves. Contextually based control derives from the fact that people understand and represent not only text and talk, but also the whole communicative situation.

Thus, CDA typically studies how context features (such as the properties of language users of powerful groups) influence the ways members of

dominated groups define the communicative situation in "preferred context models" (Martin Rojo and van Dijk 1997).

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